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1. INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical prices, on average, remain significantly higher
in the United States than in other countries.' Prices for innovative
drugs remain high due to the protections afforded by the patent
system combined with the fact that drug pricing in the United
States is largely unregulated. Currently, statutory and regulatory
controls generally prevent people in the United States from pur-
chasing cheaper drugs from foreign markets. Meanwhile, due to
the unregulated pricing in the United States, drug manufacturers
are free to set prices for their products at any level they desire. As
would any for-profit corporation, these companies endeavor to
maximize their profits and expand their business. Thus, a drug
manufacturer with the benefit of a patent will charge whatever the
market will bear to the detriment of those who cannot afford to
pay (as well as those who can).
In order to help reduce drug costs in the United States, the
* J.D. candidate, 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. 2001, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology. I would like to thank all the members of the
Journal of International Economic Law at the University of Pennsylvania for their
hard work on this Comment, and my friends and family for their love and sup-
port. Extra special thanks to Runa Ganguly for her help and encouragement.
1 See Jerry Stanton, Comment, Lesson for the United States from Foreign Price
Controls on Pharmaceuticals, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149 (2000) (providing a compara-
tive analysis of pharmaceutical pricing structures in the United States and various
foreign countries).
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House of Representatives has passed the Pharmaceutical Market
Access Act of 20032 ("PMA Act"). The PMA Act is one of the most
recent attempts to implement drug re-importation in order to take
advantage of foreign price controls. If the PMA Act becomes law,
it would require the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to
promulgate regulations allowing for the importation of FDA-
approved drugs from selected foreign countries. Drugs manufac-
tured in the United States or abroad (in FDA-approved facilities)
and sold abroad under foreign price controls could be re-imported
to the United States and sold cheaper than the current market
price.
Meanwhile, the legitimate U.S. drug distribution infrastructure,
as it stands, remains vulnerable to the threat of counterfeit drugs.
3
The threat comes from the various methods by which prescription
drugs are brought into and distributed within the country, both le-
gally and illegally. The drug price discrepancy drastically affects
the behavior of Americans and how they purchase their prescrip-
tion drugs. Various infrastructures of both dubious and certain il-
legality have also sprung up to meet their needs. These problems
illustrate the danger of drugs originating outside the United States'
borders and control. 4 This Comment discusses the re-importation
scheme which would be mandated by the PMA Act and how it
would affect the U.S. prescription drug market. Section 2 provides
an overview of drug pricing in the United States and in foreign
markets. Section 3 describes how the price differential affects the
behavior of Americans seeking lower cost prescription drugs, and
how counterfeit and adulterated drugs make their way to Ameri-
can consumers. Section 4 discusses how the PMA Act would affect
the problems of rising drug costs and counterfeit and adulterated
drugs, and analyzes whether it is actually necessary to solve the
problem of rising drug costs. Section 5 concludes that the PMA
Act would be largely ineffective in accomplishing its goals and is
an unjustifiable risk to the health of the American public.
2 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. (2003).
3 See, e.g., Heather Won Tesoriero, Big Drug Wholesaler Fights Charges of Fakes,
Price Fixing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2003, at B1 (describing a consumer who obtained
counterfeit Epogen, an anti-anemia drug, from a local CVS pharmacy).
4 See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Faults Quality of Imported Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2003, at C2 (describing results of an inspection of packages appearing to
contain imported drugs).
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2. PHARMACEUTICAL PRICING
2.1. Pharmaceutical Pricing in America
Prescription drug prices in the United States are not set accord-
ing to a normal supply and demand schemeA and except for a few
limited controls, 6 drug prices are largely unregulated. Manufac-
turers are free to set prices at whatever level they desire7 and are
not required to reveal how they set their prices.8 Common sense
would dictate that drug manufacturers set their prices in order to
maximize profits. Industry experts have suggested several meth-
ods that drug manufacturers use to set their prices, 9 all of which
are designed to yield a healthy profit.
Besides unregulated pricing, there are many reasons why
drugs cost so much in the United States. Some of the factors that
affect prices are the high development costs, exclusion rights
granted under the patent system, marketing and advertising ex-
penses, and lobbying and campaign contributions. Of course,
various factors affect individual drugs differently, but all of the fac-
tors listed contribute to the high prices of many drugs.
Developing a new drug and bringing it to market in the United
States is incredibly expensive. There are huge sunken costs associ-
ated with capital investment required for research, as well as the
amount of research and development required. According to a
5 See Michael B. Moore, "Open Wide" (Your Pocketbook That Is!) -A Call for the
Establishment in the United States of a Prescription Drug Price Regulatory Agency, 1
SW. J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 149, 155 (1994) (" [Clonsumers are generally not free to
choose which drugs to purchase, and comparison shopping is nearly impossi-
ble.").
6 See Michele L. Creech, Comment, Make a Run for the Border: Why the United
States Government is Looking to the International Market for Affordable Prescription
Drugs, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 593, 598 (2001) (describing certain negotiated drug
discounts and government-funded programs). In addition, Medicare now covers
prescription drugs. See Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, The Facts About
Upcoming New Benefits in Medicare (No. CMS-11054, Feb. 17, 2004) (detailing new
Medicare prescription drug benefits passed in the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003), at http://www.medicare.gov/
publications/pubs/pdf/11054.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
7 See Creech, supra note 6, at 599 ("Other than these limited controls, pharma-
ceutical manufacturers have complete discretion to set drug prices and are not re-
quired to divulge how they formulate the prices of pharmaceuticals.").
8 Id.
9 See id. (outlining five methods of drug pricing which healthcare industry
experts have speculated that drug companies utilize).
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Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
("PhRMA") estimate, only 1 out of every 5000 medicines tested is
eventually approved for patient use,10 and it takes 12 to 15 years to
bring a new medicine to market." The average cost of doing so is
$800 million.12 Furthermore, only 30% of approved drugs generate
enough revenue to recoup the average development costs. 13 All of
these costs are the result not only of the complicated process of dis-
covering or inventing new medicines, but also of the stringent FDA
requirements for new drug approval, 14 manufacture, and distribu-
tion.'5 These high development costs -and the uncertainty of de-
veloping a revenue generating product at all -create barriers to en-
try into the pharmaceutical industry, resulting in a relatively small
number of competing companies.
The patent system is the major driving force of innovation, not
just for the pharmaceuticals but for all types of technology. The
reward for invention is the right to exclude others from making,
using, or importing the invention for the duration of the patent.
16
Patent rights give pharmaceutical manufacturers the ability to keep
prices high in order to recoup the high costs of developing new
drugs by excluding generic manufacturers from copying their drug
10 Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Why Do Medicines
Cost So Much?, at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/brochure/
questions/whycostmuch.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
11 Id.
12 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FY 2003 Performance Report to the
President and the Congress, at http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/report2003/
default.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
13 Id.; see also Ariel Dillon, Will Re-importation Lower Prescription Drug Prices?,
INDEP. INST. (Aug. 20, 2003) (explaining why drug prices in the United States are
higher than those in the rest of the world), available at http:// www.independent.
org/tii/news/030820dillon.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
14 See generally U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Just the Facts: FDA and the
Drug Development Process: How the Agency Ensures that Drugs are Safe and Effective
(Feb. 2002) (describing the FDA new drug approval process), at http://www.fda.
gov/opacom/factsheets/justthefacts/17drgdev.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
15 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Takes Actions Against Illegal
Drug Import Operations of Expedite-Rx, SPC Global Technologies, and Employer Health
Options (Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter FDA Talk Paper] ("FDA's drug approvals are
manufacturer-specific and product-specific . . . includ[ing] manufacturing
location, formulation, source and specifications of active ingredients, processing
methods, manufacturing controls, container/closure system, and appearance."), at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/answers/2004/ansO1277.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
16 The term of a patent is twenty years from the date of filing the patent ap-
plication. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2004).
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until the patent expires. 17 Because the new drug approval process
is so lengthy, the useful life of a drug patent is often far less than
the statutory term. However, drug manufacturers can obtain ex-
tensions for up to 5 years under limited circumstances due to the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.18 In
general, patent rights are extremely significant in keeping drug
prices high for many years after their invention.
Another factor that contributes to the high cost of drugs is the
cost of marketing and advertising. Not surprisingly, drug manu-
facturers spend large amounts of money on marketing and adver-
tising their products. In 1992, drug manufacturers spent 22.5% of
their revenues on marketing and advertising while spending only
16% on research and development.19 Spending on marketing and
advertising has only increased since that time, with several drug
companies spending nearly 40% of their revenues on marketing. 20
Lobbying and campaign contributions also play an important
role in drug pricing.21 Drug manufacturers spend large sums of
money on their lobbying efforts. For the 2003-2004 fiscal year,
PhRMA set a lobbying budget of $150 million, an increase of 23%
over the previous year.2 2 This cost pales in comparison to the total
amount spent on research and development in 2003, $33.2 billion,23
but it is not insignificant.
17 Generic drugs undercut the price of pioneer drugs by as much as 80-90%.
See Robert Goldberg, Pharmaceutical Price Controls: Saving Money Today or Lives
Tomorrow? (Sept. 1, 1993) (describing the effects of generic drugs on price), avail-
able at http://www.ipi.org/ipi/IPIPublications.nsf/PublicationLook upFull-
Text/20D973FFEBDCBA23862568E0006F1909 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
18 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 35 U.S.C. § 156
(2004).
19 Moore, supra note 5, n.4.
20 See Consumer Project on Technology, Pharmaceutical Company Expenses:
Cost of Sales, Marketing, R&D Compared (Apr. 19, 2000) (listing revenue spent on
marketing and research as a percentage of sales for various pharmaceutical com-
panies), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/econ/allocation.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2004).
21 See Creech, supra note 6, at 608 (noting that millions of dollars are spent on
lobbying and campaign contributions each year).
22 Robert Pear, Drug Companies Increase Spending on Efforts to Lobby Congress
and Governments, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2003, at 33.
23 Press Release, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
Pharmaceutical Companies Receive FDA Approval for 35 New Medicines in 2003;
Invest an Estimated $33.2 Billion in R&D (Jan. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/22.01.2004.894.cfm (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2004).
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What is more significant about PhRMA's lobbying campaign
than the up-front cost is the effect that it has had on the U.S. drug
market. Without having spent these funds, the landscape of the
current law might be very different. For example, in October 2000,
President Clinton signed into law the Medicine Equity and Drug
Safety Act ("MEDS Act"), an early attempt to use drug re-
importation to lower drug prices.24 Shortly thereafter, Donna Sha-
lala, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, de-implemented
the MEDS Act as permitted within the language of the Act 25 be-
cause it had several problems which would have mitigated its ef-
fectiveness.26 Many believe that lobbying efforts by PhRMA were
what led to those loopholes and the ultimate demise of the MEDS
Act.
27
2.2. Pharmaceutical Pricing Abroad
The United States is one of the few industrialized nations with-
out government-imposed drug price regulation. 28 As a result of
foreign price controls, prices for drugs in those countries often cost
far less than they do in the United States. The evidence shows that
both strict and loose price controls can result in relief from high
drug prices.
At the center of the debate for drug importation is Canada,
where strict government price controls have resulted in far lower
drug costs for Canadians. For example, in 2001, a supply of Prozac
cost $105 in the United States, while it cost $62 in Canada.29 Pril-
24 See Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act ("MEDS Act"), 21 U.S.C. § 384
(2000) (permitting the Secretary of Health & Human Services to implement regu-
lations providing for the re-importation of FDA-approved drugs from select coun-
tries).
25 See id. § 384(l)(1) ("This section shall become effective only if the Secretary
certifies to the Congress that the implementation of this section will (A) pose no
additional risk to the public's health and safety; and (B) result in a significant re-
duction in the cost of covered products to the American consumer.").
26 See Creech, supra note 6, at 636 ("There were several problems with the lan-
guage of the MEDS Act that led to its demise.").
27 See id. at 635 ("The heavy investments in opposition to the final MEDS Act
undoubtedly affected the final version of the legislation.").
28 Stanton, supra note 1, at 155.
29 Talk of the Nation: Obstacles to Re-importing Prescription Drugs from Abroad as
a Way to Lower Pharmaceutical Drug Prices in the United States (National Public
Radio broadcast, Jan. 2, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter NPR Radio
Broadcast].
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osec cost $360 in the United States and $170 in Canada.30 On aver-
age, drugs in Canada cost 30-50% less than they do in the United
States.3
1
In Canada, drug prices are strictly regulated by the Patented
Medicines Prices Review Board ("PMPRB"), a government agency.
The PMPRB sets drug prices by comparing a drug's price to for-
eign prices of the same drug, domestic prices of similar drugs, and
changes in the Canada Consumer Price Index.32 The PMPRB has
strict authority to set the price as it sees fit, and although it can
consider manufacturing and marketing costs, it cannot take the
cost of research and development into its calculations.
33
France provides national healthcare and has a national budget
for the purchase of drugs.34 Although manufacturers have some
say in setting prices, the government must approve the prices be-
fore the manufacturers can be reimbursed. Thus, drug manufac-
turers are unable to collect any more than is reimbursed by the na-
tional healthcare system.
The United Kingdom, which does not directly regulate drug
prices, has a national healthcare system which distributes drugs to
residents. 35 Unlike in France, where prices are set through the di-
rect government reimbursement program, the United Kingdom's
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme ("PPRS") indirectly regu-
lates drug prices by regulating companies' profits on an individual
basis.36 Even though the manufacturers have much more leeway in
setting prices, the limits on their overall profits have been effective
in controlling drug prices.
37
The lesson to be learned is that a variety of government-
imposed price controls can curtail drug prices, evidenced in the
price discrepancies between the cost of drugs in the United States
and abroad. This section illustrates what factors contribute to high
drug prices and how prices abroad manage to stay below the levels
30 Id.
31 Leila Abboud, FDA Gets Tougher on Drugs From Canada, WALL ST. J., Nov.
20, 2003, at D1 [hereinafter FDA Gets Tougher].
32 Stanton, supra note 1, at 161.
33 Id.
34 See generally Creech, supra note 6, at 616 (describing France's national drug
budget and the process of reimbursement).
35 See generally id. at 619 (describing the United Kingdom's National Health
Service).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 620.
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in the United States. What is not so clear is what the effect of the
PMA Act on U.S. drug prices would be, or what the effect of low-
ered drug prices - and reduced profits for drug manufacturers -
would be on the drug industry or the behavior of Americans seek-
ing cheaper drugs. The next Section examines how the price dis-
crepancy currently affects the behavior of both Americans who
purchase drugs and those who try to make a profit based on that
discrepancy, both legitimate and counterfeit. It also examines how
counterfeit and adulterated drugs make their way to American
drug purchasers.
3. THE EFFECTS OF HIGH DRUG PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES
3.1. The Behavior of Americans
The high cost of drugs in the United States has resulted in some
difficult choices for many Americans. According to the Kaiser
Foundation, 30% of senior citizens in the United States skip pills or
do not fill prescriptions because of cost considerations.38 In the al-
ternative, rather than forgo treatment altogether or pay the high
prices of the local pharmacy, many Americans pursue other ave-
nues of drug procurement.
3.1.1. Personal Importation
Due to the drug price discrepancy, there are huge monetary in-
centives for individuals to attempt to obtain drugs from a foreign
country at discounted prices. Obviously, this is not a very practical
solution for most, nor is it necessarily as safe as purchasing drugs
from a reputable pharmacy within the United States.39
The most direct form of personal importation involves physi-
cally traveling to another country, such as Mexico or Canada
(clearly the most convenient choices for most Americans), purchas-
ing the drugs at discount prices, and bringing them back across the
38 Joel B. Finkelstein, House Drops FDA Safeguards From Drug Re-importation
Bill, AM. MED. NEWs, Aug. 18, 2003, at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2003/08/18/gvsaO8l8.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
39 Canadian Prescription Drug Importation: Is There a Safety Issue?: Hearing Before
the House Comm. on Gov't Reform Subcomm. on Human Rights and Wellness, 108th
Cong. 12 (2003) (statement of William K. Hubbard, Assoc. Comm'r for Pol'y and
Planning, claiming that the FDA, for many years, has consistently stated that it
cannot assure the safety of prescription drugs that are obtained outside its com-
prehensive regulatory system).
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border. This is made possible by the discretion of the FDA under
the personal use importation policy.40 Ordinarily, importation of
any unapproved drug is illegal under the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act ("FDCA"),41 and the re-importation of even FDA-
approved drugs from FDA-approved facilities by anyone other
than the manufacturer is illegal under the Prescription Drug Mar-
keting Act ("PDMA").42 However, under the personal importation
policy, Americans can personally bring small quantities of both
approved (for the treatment of a non-serious condition) and unap-
proved (for the treatment of either serious or non-serious condi-
tions) drugs across the border for their personal use.
43
The FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual advises that even if
drugs appear to violate statutes or regulations, FDA personnel may
use their discretion to examine the background, risk, and purpose
of the product in making a decision as to whether or not to allow
personal importation.44 Decisions are based on the discretion of
FDA personnel,45 and people who are not allowed to carry drugs
across the border have no legal recourse because there is no indi-
vidual right under either the Constitution, the FDCA, or the Regu-
latory Procedures Manual to import drugs, approved or not.
Personal importation has become widespread, and an industry
of across-the-border pharmacies caters to U.S. travelers trying to
find a better deal. In 2000, it was estimated that there were 1000
pharmacies in Tijuana, Mexico (one pharmacy for every 1300 resi-
dents). By contrast, San Diego had about 125 pharmacies (1 phar-
macy for every 10,800 residents).46 In the current market, propo-
40 See generally Peter S. Reichertz & Melinda S. Friend, Hiding Behind Agency
Discretion: The Food and Drug Administration's Personal Use Drug Importation Policy,
9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 493, 494 (2000) (describing FDA's personal use impor-
tation policy of FRD regulated drugs, which allows people to import limited
quantities -usually no more than a three month supply).
41 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2003).
42 Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987, 21 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (2003).
43 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual,
Chapter 9, Subchapter on Coverage of Personal Importations [hereinafter Regulatory
Procedures Manual] (detailing the recommended procedures FDA personnel
should follow when assessing to allow personal importation in a given case), at
http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance-ref/rpmnew2/ch9pers.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2004).
44 FDA Talk Paper, supra note 15.
45 FDA personnel do not always have complete discretion. The FDA rou-
tinely issues import alerts that absolutely prohibit entry of certain drug products.
Reichertz & Friend, supra note 40, at 494.
46 Letter from William J. Tauzin, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Com-
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nents of drug re-importation, who wish to lower drug prices, con-
done personal importation from these pharmacies despite the in-
herent risks. U.S. Representative Bernard Sanders of Vermont re-
cently admitted to accompanying six senior citizens on a bus trip to
Canada for the purpose of purchasing cheaper prescription
drugs.4
7
3.1.2. Buyers' Clubs
In 1987, the People With AIDS ("PWA") Health Group formed
the first buyers' club in order to import unapproved AIDS drugs
for its members in the United States.48 It expected a bitter fight
with the FDA regarding the large quantities of unapproved drugs
imported for others. However, in 1988, the FDA decided to offi-
cially allow the importation of unapproved drugs for the treatment
of AIDS or cancer under "Pilot Guidance." 49 Then, in 1989, the
FDA formally added the policy into the Regulatory Procedures
Manual specifically for the importation of drugs for treatment of a
serious or life-threatening condition.50
The buyers' clubs provided people who were unable to person-
ally travel across the border with the opportunity to purchase
lower-cost, unapproved drugs. The FDA has generally continued
to let them operate relatively freely, even though they tended to
violate the personal importation policy by importing much more
than a three-month supply.5' However, the FDA has not tolerated
the buyers' clubs' importing of foreign versions of approved drugs
in order to save money for its customers, operating for commercial,
rather than humanitarian purposes, or engaging in repackaging or
merce, et al., to Bernard Schwetz, Acting Principal Deputy, Comm. on Food and
Drug Admin. et al. (Mar. 14, 2001), at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
107/Letters/03142001113.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
47 NPR Radio Broadcast, supra note 29. Importation from Canada is admittedly
less risky than from Mexico, where it is estimated that the amount of counterfeit
and substandard medication could be as high as 25%. Continuing Concerns Over
Imported Pharmaceuticals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 160 (2001) (statement of
James Christian, Vice President and Head of Corporate Security, Novartis Int'l
AG).
48 Paula Span, Pharmacy For the Desperate: AIDS Drug Buyers' Clubs, Dispensing
Untested Hope, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 1992, at D1.
49 Reichertz & Friend, supra note 40, at 501.
50 Regulatory Procedures Manual, supra note 43.
51 Reichertz & Friend, supra note 40, at 505.
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recompounding of drugs.52 Today, due to an improved array of
AIDS therapies available in the United States and concerns about
the quality of unapproved foreign drugs, 53 most AIDS buyers'
clubs have ceased importing unapproved drugs.
5 4
3.1.3. Internet Pharmacies
The most recent development in the importation of drugs is the
proliferation of internet pharmacies. While many legal internet
pharmacies, such as CVS.com, simply seek to offer their customers
the convenience of ordering drugs over the Internet, and do so
only with a valid prescription,55 an overwhelming number of other
websites seek to take advantage of the discrepancy between U.S.
and foreign drug prices by offering foreign-made or re-imported
drugs without a prescription.
5 6
Online sales from foreign pharmacies are increasing exponen-
tially. The FDA estimates 5 million packages of drugs were im-
ported in 2003 via internet transactions, up from 2 million in 2002
and 1 million in 2001. 57 Although drug importing websites main-
tain that they are providing a service for people who are legally
importing drugs under the personal importation policy discussed
above, that policy is discretionary and the FDA has no obligation
to allow imported drugs to cross U.S. borders.5 8 Many of these
internet pharmacies either misinterpret or outright defy the
bounds of the personal importation policy by leading customers to
believe that their activity is perfectly legal.5 9 However, the FDA
routinely maintains that it considers the mail order importation of
drugs illegal and outside the bounds of the personal importation
52 Id. at 503-06.
53 See, e.g., id. at 505 (noting that most imported dideoxycytidine, a popular
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") drug in the early 1990s, either
did not contain the active ingredient at all or did not meet accepted potency or
purity standards).
54 Id. at 506.
55 CVS Pharmacy, Prescription Information, at http://www.cvs.com/CVS
App/cvs/gateway/help/helpRxnfo#verify (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
56 See Ivette P. Gomez, Note, Beyond the Neighborhood Drugstore: U.S. Regula-
tion of Online Prescription Drug Sales by Foreign Businesses, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 431, 432-33 (2002) ("These sites greatly outnumber the legitimate online
pharmacies - 400 to 6 by estimates made in 2000.").
57 FDA Gets Tougher, supra note 31.
58 Regulatory Procedures Manual, supra note 43.
59 FDA Gets Tougher, supra note 31.
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3.2. Counterfeit and Adulterated Drugs
As discussed above in Section 2, the exacting FDA require-
ments for approval, manufacture, and distribution of approved
drugs help ensure the safety of Americans who take them. How-
ever, there is growing concern over the safety of drugs obtained
from legitimate real world pharmacies,61 let alone illegally operat-
ing internet pharmacies.
Counterfeit drugs come in many forms. Some contain too little
of the active ingredient.62 For example, in May 2002, investigators
found vials labeled as Epogen, an anti-anemia drug, that contained
only 5% of the active ingredient that it was supposed to have.63
Counterfeiters also took vials of low strength Procrit, another anti-
anemia drug, and affixed labels to them that indicated maximum
strength, increasing the price by a factor of twenty.64 In other
cases, counterfeit drugs are found to contain cheaper generic forms
of the drug or no active ingredient at all.65 Additionally, the drugs
could contain substances that might be quite dangerous.
The danger of these counterfeit drugs is two-fold. First, people
who take them could be under-medicated or not medicated at all.
When being treated for a serious condition, this could have dire
consequences for the health of the consumer. Second, taking coun-
terfeit drugs can be quite dangerous because the drugs were not
necessarily manufactured according to FDA regulations and could
have dangerous interactions with the patient. A sixteen year-old
boy taking counterfeit Epogen to help recover from a liver trans-
plant experienced excruciating cramps for two months until he
started taking the legitimate drug.66 There are numerous other ex-
60 FDA Talk Paper, supra note 15.
61 See Naomi Aoki, Real Fears Over Phony Drugs: U.S. Health Officials View
Spate of Recent Cases as Evidence of Rising Trend, BOSTON GLOBE, May 29, 2002, at C1
(quoting Ken Johnson, spokesman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
"[w]e're afraid that if this trend continues unchecked, some unsuspecting con-
sumer will wind up dead.").
62 Leila Abboud et al., Fakes in the Medicine Chest, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2003, at
B1 [hereinafter Fakes].
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Melody Petersen, 3 Fake Drugs Are Found in Pharmacies, N.Y. TIMEs, June 5,
2001, at C1.
66 Tesoriero, supra note 3.
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amples of counterfeit drugs appearing in local pharmacies and
hospitals in the United States which were obtained through the
regulated infrastructure. 67 Although the trend has been for most
counterfeit drugs to be found in small batches, 68 that trend may be
changing. As of June 2003, distributors had recalled 200,000 bottles
of Lipitor, a cholesterol-lowering drug taken by 18 million Ameri-
cans.69 The counterfeit Lipitor was found to contain a mixture of
foreign versions of the medicine, the actual FDA-approved version,
and unauthorized versions with some percentage of the active in-
gredient.70 Despite the FDA's best efforts, these counterfeit drugs
still sometimes manage to make it to the market, much to the fi-
nancial reward of entrepreneurial counterfeiters.
Most legitimate prescription drugs in the United States arrive
at pharmacies through the primary market.71 That is where the
three major primary wholesalers, AmerisourceBergen Corp., Car-
dinal Health Inc., and McKesson Corp., as well as other smaller
companies, buy drugs directly from manufacturers and sell them
directly to hospitals, nursing homes, and retail pharmacies.
72
Counterfeit drugs tend to infiltrate the drug supply through
the intervention of secondary wholesalers. 73 Secondary market
drug distributors generally purchase their product from primary
wholesalers selling excess stock.74 Secondary wholesalers sell their
drugs to retail outlets, each other, or back to the primary wholesal-
ers when they need drugs on short notice.75 Counterfeiting infiltra-
tion arises when secondary wholesalers trade in a grey market of
legally manufactured but illegally sold drugs with other individu-
als who may be peddling counterfeits. "Counterfeiting and diver-
67 Peterson, supra note 65.
68 Aoki, supra note 61.
69 Counterfeit Lipitor Information Center, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.counterfeit-lipitor.com/faq/index.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
70 Fakes, supra note 62.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Donald E. deKieffer, The Mexican Drug Connection: How Trade in
Pharmaceuticals has Wrecked the FDA, 9 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 321, 327 (2002). See
generally U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA's Counterfeit Drug Task Force
Interim Report (Oct. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Interim Report] (outlining the
vulnerabilities in the U.S. drug distribution network), at http://www.fda.gov/
oc/initiatives/counterfeit/report/interim-report.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2004).
74 Fakes, supra note 62.
75 Id.
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sion go hand in hand," according to Steven J. Haynes, former spe-
cial agent in charge of the investigative division of the office of
criminal investigation of the FDA.76 Drugs often bounce to multi-
ple wholesalers before hitting the retail market.77 The origin of a
drug can become unknown as it passes from warehouse to ware-
house. 78 The more a drug gets diverted, the more opportunities
there are for unscrupulous individuals to adulterate them, such as
by altering the expiration date.
The counterfeit drugs can break into the grey market from a
variety of sources. Secondary distributors sometimes buy dis-
counted overstock drugs illegally re-sold by hospitals or nursing
homes, 79 or by individuals who fraudulently obtained them by
posing as a hospital or nursing home (in order to negotiate a dis-
count price).80 Sometimes the secondary wholesalers themselves
intentionally introduce counterfeit drugs into the system.81 Al-
though the primary wholesalers have instituted safeguards to pre-
vent the purchase of counterfeit drugs, 82 the constant diversion of
drugs on the secondary market makes it relatively easy for coun-
terfeit drugs to infiltrate unnoticed.
The risk of counterfeit drugs, even from our trusted local
pharmacies, is apparent. Much greater, though, is the risk of ob-
taining counterfeit drugs from international sources. The World
Health Organization estimates that 7-8% of the world's drug sup-
ply is counterfeit.83 Furthermore, that percentage may be as high
76 Peterson, supra note 65.
77 Fakes, supra note 62 (quoting John Taylor, Assoc. Comm'r, Food and Drug
Admin.).
78 Peterson, supra note 65.
79 Fakes, supra note 62.
80 Peterson, supra note 65.
81 See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 65 (reporting that between 1991 and 1993,
Moshe Milstein, while operating a drug distribution business out of his home, re-
packaged foreign made prescriptions, some of which contained bacteria and en-
dotoxins, and sold them as American-made to pharmacies and doctors in the New
York area).
82 See, e.g., Tesoriero, supra note 3 (detailing AmerisourceBergen's security
measures, which include a nonrefundable application fee, liability insurance by
the secondary wholesaler, criminal background checks on the principals of the
firm, unannounced inspections, and pedigrees on all purchases).
83 ABC News, Tainted Health, Jan. 7, 2004, at http://more.abcnews.go.com/
sections/business/World/counterfeitdrugs_040107.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2004).
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as 50-60% in parts of Africa and 25% in Mexico. 84
By purchasing drugs at an across-the-border pharmacy, or
from an internet pharmacy that purports to offer discounted for-
eign drugs (especially one that does not require a prescription), an
individual puts him or herself at risk for obtaining counterfeit
drugs. During July and August 2003, in spot inspections of pack-
ages from selected foreign countries, the FDA found that 88% of
the packages contained unapproved drugs.8 5 Besides drugs that
are not approved in the United States at all, they found unap-
proved foreign versions of drugs, inappropriately packaged drugs,
and drugs with inadequate labeling.86 By purchasing and using
these drugs, Americans put themselves at much greater risk to the
dangers mentioned above.
This is not to suggest that the proposed legalization of prescrip-
tion drug re-importation would remove all the barriers to these
foreign drugs from entering into the domestic drug supply. On the
contrary, the strict importation procedures that the FDA would re-
quire in accordance with the PMA Act would generally keep the
current illegal methods of importation illegal. The guidelines for
personal importation would not change either. The key to the in-
creased danger is the inclusion of foreign importers in the drug
distribution chain.
Re-importation would place links in the chain in parts of the
world - outside U.S. control - with an abundance of cheaper but
unapproved drugs. The high percentage of unapproved drugs
found in the inspected packages shipped from foreign countries
indicates how allowing importation by anyone other than the
original manufacturers could weaken the integrity of the drug
supply. Foreign importers would be just as susceptible, if not more
so, to counterfeit drug infiltration as the U.S distributors because
they are outside the direct control of the FDA. Drug re-
importation would force the FDA to loosen its grip on the drug
distribution chain, and this could damage the health of Americans.
84 Susan J. Landers, Pharmaceutical Fakes, Knockoffs a Growing Problem, AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 26, 2001 (quoting Lewis Kontnik, founder of Reconnaissance In-
ternational), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2001/11/26/
hlsbll26.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
85 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA/U.S. Customs Import Blitz Exams
Reveal Hundreds of Potentially Dangerous Imported Drug Shipments (Sept. 29, 2003), at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00948.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
86 Id.
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The United States is already dealing with a growing counterfeit
drug problem.8 7 Concern for the problem is so high that in July
2003, the commissioner of the FDA formed a Counterfeit Drug
Task Force88 ("Task Force") specifically charged, among other
things, with developing recommendations for preventing the in-
troduction of counterfeit drugs into the U.S. market.8 9 The recent
increase in the level of infiltration of counterfeit drugs in the
United States illustrates the potential weakness of a drug distribu-
tion chain that does not even include foreign importers. By intro-
ducing foreign links that are vulnerable to counterfeit drug infiltra-
tion, into the drug distribution chain, re-importation would
exacerbate the counterfeit drug problem that the United States is
already struggling to minimize. The next Section shows how the
PMA Act would affect prescription drug prices and counterfeit
drug infiltration, and it examines whether it is necessary to use re-
importation to lower prices.
4. THE PHARMACEUTICAL MARKET ACCESS ACT OF 2003
4.1. The Mechanics of the PMA Act
The goal of the PMA Act was to allow Americans access to for-
eign drug markets where, as discussed above, drug prices are sig-
nificantly lower.90 The theory was that by opening the market to
cheaper, but nevertheless FDA-approved drugs originally sold in a
foreign country, Americans would immediately be able to save
considerable sums of money.
The PMA Act would alter the current law, which allows only a
manufacturer to re-import its own drugs, by compelling the Secre-
87 See Interim Report, supra note 73 ("FDA counterfeit drug investigations have
increased to over 20 per year since 2000, after averaging only 5 per year through
the late 1990's.").
88 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Combating Counterfeit Drugs: A Report
of the Food and Drug Administration (Feb. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Final Report], at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/counterfeit/reportO2_O4.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2004).
89 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Anti-Counterfeiting Task Force
Interim Report Focuses on High-Tech Weapons and Other Promising New Counter
Measures (Oct. 2, 2003), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/
NEW00949.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
90 See Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. §
3(1) (2003) ("To give all Americans immediate relief from the outrageously high
cost of pharmaceuticals.").
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tary of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations
which would allow pharmacists, wholesalers, and qualifying indi-
viduals to import FDA-approved drugs.91 The law would only al-
low re-importation of FDA-approved drugs from covered coun-
tries, 92 which were originally manufactured in FDA-approved
facilities, 93 and provide for a number of safeguards 94 that attempt
to avoid the safety problem posed by importing drugs, in addition
to the strict chain of custody requirements which were also in-
cluded in the MEDS Act.95
4.2. PMA Act as a Consumer Cost Cutter
The proponents of the PMA Act maintain that it will lower
drug costs for American consumers by opening up the interna-
tional drug markets to the United States.96 The commonly quoted
baseline is that American senior citizens will spend $1.8 trillion on
prescription drugs from 2004 to 2013, according to the Congres-
sional Budget Office ("CBO").97 Proponents claim that Americans
pay 30-300% more for the same prescription drugs, and that senior
citizens will save 35%, or $630 million out of that $1.8 trillion.98
However, this amount is based on several flawed assumptions as
Americans cannot possibly save nearly that much. In fact, a recent
CBO study estimated that the PMA Act would reduce total pre-
scription drug expenditures in the United States over the 2004-2013
period by $40 billion, rather than $630 billion.99 Savings on pre-
91 Id. § 4(1).
92 21 U.S.C. § 384(f).
93 Fairdrugprices.org, Summary of the Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003
[hereinafter Summary], at http://www.fairdrugprices.org/summary.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2004).
94 See Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 5
(2003) (requiring that imported prescription drugs be packaged and shipped us-
ing counterfeit-resistant technologies).
95 See MEDS Act, 21 U.S.C. § 384(d) (2000) (detailing importers' reporting re-
quirements, including chain of custody pedigrees, for imported drugs).
96 See 149 CONG. REC. H7531 (daily ed. July 24, 2003) (statement of Rep. Emer-
son) ("We can alleviate the budget-busting burdens on American seniors.").
97 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 2(1)
(2003).
98 Summary, supra note 93.
99 Congressional Budget Office, Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R.
2427 The Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003 (Nov. 19, 2003) [hereinafter CBO
Estimate] (approved by Robert A. Sunshine, Ass't Dir. For Budget Analysis, Cong.
Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4852
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scription drugs would be limited by several key impediments to
the allegedly free market, most notably the size of the current
drugs supply available for parallel trade. 00 In addition, further
hindrances are likely to be imposed by the FDA, U.S. drug manu-
facturers, and foreign governments. 10 1
The CBO estimates prices for drugs subject to patent protection
are on average 35-55% cheaper in the covered foreign markets than
in the United States. 10 2 Based on the current levels of parallel trade
between European countries and on the relative sizes of the drug
markets in the United States and the covered countries, a maxi-
mum of 10-15% of the U.S. market could be supplied through par-
allel trade, the practice of importing drugs from countries with
lower prices.103 For reasons discussed below, the CBO cautions,
however, that U.S. consumers will not be able to save this amount,
nor will that much of the market be sustained through parallel
trade.104
Even if the PMA Act becomes law, the FDA will not be able to
promulgate regulations that will not make the maximum amount
of foreign drugs eligible for re-importation into the U.S. market.
Even proponents of the PMA Act note, it would only allow for the
importation of FDA-approved drugs from FDA-approved facili-
ties.105 The bulk of prescription drugs now being illegally im-
ported purport to be foreign versions of FDA-approved drugs
0 6
and are not from FDA-approved facilities. Thus, the vast majority
of potential illegal imports currently fail to meet FDA standards.
10 7
This limitation on supply is a key hindrance to the alleged poten-
tial free market.
Furthermore, even if the world supply of FDA approved drugs
is increased, such an increase could not be realized without costs.
In order to increase the amount of FDA-approved drugs available
for re-importation, pursuant to its stringent requirements, the FDA
&sequence=O (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
100 Id. Parallel trade is the legal importing and exporting without the explicit
consent of the manufacturer.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Summary, supra note 93.
106 FDA Talk Paper, supra note 15.
107 Id.
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would have to inspect and approve facilities that currently manu-
facture drugs sold outside of the United States. For facilities that
do not meet FDA requirements, manufacturers would have to in-
vest capital in these facilities in order to obtain approval. This in-
vestment would be reflected in an increase in the price of drugs
manufactured in those facilities. However, manufacturers probably
would not even bother if it meant increasing the supply of drugs
available to undercut their healthy profits in the U.S. Thus, it is not
true that all drugs that are currently available more cheaply in
other countries could be sold just as cheaply in the United States by
allowing re-importation.
Drug manufacturers will also react to changes in the law in or-
der to protect their profits. Manufacturers of FDA-approved drugs
are profit-maximizing actors who do not wish to have their profits
reduced, so it follows that they will do everything they can, legally,
to reduce the supply of drugs available for re-importation. They
have the incentive to restrict supplies of drugs available for re-
importation because their domestic sales would be undercut by the
import of drugs subject to foreign price controls.108 There are a
number of strategies available to them to accomplish this objec-
tive.109
A powerful tool in drug manufacturers' arsenal of weapons
that may limit supply of FDA-approved drugs in foreign countries
available for re-importation is limiting the supply of drugs shipped
to those countries. One strategy, to that end, is to restrict the quan-
tity shipped to foreign countries to the expected level of each coun-
try's consumption, rather than selling the maximum amount that
they can." 0 A second strategy would be to restrict sales to specific
buyers found or suspected to be engaging in re-importation."' The
reduced supply of drugs available for re-importation would result
in a smaller effect on U.S. drug prices.
108 CBO Estimate, supra note 99.
109 See generally id. (describing the strategies that drug manufacturers are ex-
pected to utilize to prevent the re-importation of drugs).
110 Id.; see also Dillon, supra note 13 ("[A]s Pfizer has already said they'll do,
companies might limit exports to quantities large enough only for the importing
country's domestic supply.").
111 See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, AstraZeneca To Limit Sales of Its
Drugs to Canadian Pharmacies and Wholesalers (Apr. 22, 2003) (noting that Astra-
Zenaca and GlaxoSmithKline intend to reduce drug sales to pharmacies that en-
gage in re-importation to the United States), at http://www.kaisemetwork.org/
daily-reports/repindex.cfm?DRID=17294 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
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The second method drug manufacturers may be able to employ
to prevent price erosion in the United States is through contracts.
Even though the PMA Act retains the portion of the MEDS Act
which stated that "[n]o manufacturer of a covered product may en-
ter into a contract or agreement that includes a provision to pre-
vent the sale or distribution of covered products.. .",112 it still may
be possible for manufacturers to contract to interfere with the re-
sale of prescription drugs back into the United States113 by estab-
lishing contracts with foreign distributors that require them to sell
back to the United States above a specified price floor, or at the
price of a domestic counterpart,1 4 or that restrict the sale of drugs
to entities that export to the United States."
5
Third, drug manufacturers could sell only prescription drugs
that do not meet the FDA packaging requirements in foreign coun-
tries. Because the PMA Act requires imported drugs to have cer-
tain counterfeit-resistant technologies, 1 6 manufacturers could sup-
ply drugs to foreign countries that do not satisfy this
requirement, 117 so that they could not be re-imported. This particu-
lar strategy could be countered, however, if the FDA promulgates
a regulation allowing wholesalers to re-package and re-label re-
imported drugs, as the CBO expects it would." 8 In addition,
manufacturers could shift production of drugs for sale in foreign
markets to non-FDA-approved facilities." 9 With all these tools at
their disposal, drug manufacturers could be successful at reducing
the supply of cheaper drugs in foreign markets available for re-
importation.
The greatest misconception about drug re-importation is that
the only market effect it will have will be to reduce the price of
drugs in the United States (even if that reduction is not as dramatic
112 21 U.S.C. § 384(h) (2003).
113 See 146 CONG. REC. S10677 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (describing provisions to prevent manufacturer control of drug pric-
ing).
114 Robert Pear, In a Turnaround, Mhite House Kills Drug-Import Plan, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al.
115 CBO Estimate, supra note 99.
116 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 5
(2003).
117 See CBO Estimate, supra note 99 (describing manufacturer's strategies to
restrict the supply of foreign drugs).
118 Id.
119 Id.
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as expected). In fact, the legalization of drug importation could
very likely result in a number of perverse results. 20 If drug manu-
facturers do not increase sales to foreign countries, importers seek-
ing to profit from parallel trade will rapidly create drug shortage in
those countries 121 because drug markets in foreign markets are
much smaller than the U.S. drug market.122 Foreign countries
would then be forced to raise prices by relaxing price controls in
order to prevent such a shortage.123 Therefore, drug re-importation
would very likely result in significant price increases in foreign
countries which would erode potential savings to U.S. consumers,
as well as increase costs to consumers in foreign countries.124 As an
alternative, foreign governments may react by enacting laws that
would limit drug exports to the United States.125 This direct limita-
tion on the supply of drugs available for re-importation would sti-
fle the price-reducing goal of the PMA Act.
Finally, there are a number of additional costs associated with
drug re-importation which would be passed on to U.S. consumers.
The transaction costs associated with re-importation, including the
costs of liability insurance, re-labeling and re-packaging to meet
FDA requirements, transportation, and distribution would further
erode the savings to American consumers.1 26
For all the reasons mentioned above, the cost savings to the
American public caused by the PMA Act would not be nearly as
dramatic as the PMA Act's sponsors hope or claim. In addition,
the market effects and political ramifications in other countries
may be quite undesirable. Before enacting such a bill into law,
lawmakers should be aware of the magnitude of savings caused by
drug re-importation and weigh it against the market effects in for-
120 See John E. Calfee, The Grim Economics of Pharmaceutical Importation, (Nov.
1, 2003) (describing the possible economic effects of drug importation), at http://
www.aei.org/publications/filter.,publD.19380/pub-detail.asp (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
121 Id.
122 See id. (noting that Canada's and Germany's pharmaceutical markets are
5% and one ninth the size of the U.S. market, respectively).
123 See id. (detailing the possible effects that drug re-importation would have
on Canadian prices).
124 See Nina Owcharenko, Debunking the Myths of Drug Importation (July 20,
2004) ("[Dirug prices will not drop in the United States as much as they will rise
abroad."), at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm542.cfm (last
visited Oct. 15, 2004).
125 CBO Estimate, supra note 99.
126 Id.
2004] 1067
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
eign countries as well as the drug safety consequences.
4.3. The PMA Act's Impact on Drug Safety
There are a number of serious problems with the PMA Act that
could leave drug imports vulnerable to counterfeit drugs. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.2, the general concern with the drug importa-
tion is that because the incidence of counterfeit drugs outside the
United States is so high, and because drugs diverted through sec-
ondary markets are more likely to be counterfeit, drugs which have
been diverted between distributors outside of the United States,
and outside the control of the FDA, are much more likely to be
counterfeit. In addition to this problem, the PMA Act has several
problems with its language, and the requirement for counterfeit-
resistant technologies 27 may not be able to compensate for the in-
creased risk of counterfeit infiltration because there is no single
"magic bullet" against counterfeiters. A multi-pronged strategy is
required to secure the drug supply. 28
One danger of the PMA Act is that it requires re-importation
regulation promulgation within 180 days of the Act's enactment.129
It is not feasible to require the FDA to enact regulation dictating
requirements for anti-counterfeiting technology in such a short
amount of time.
In its Interim Report, published in October, 2003, the Task
Force identified many technologies that could help thwart counter-
feit drug threats.130 Following its call for public comment, the Task
force published its Final Report in February, 2004 and evaluated
the possible anti-counterfeiting measures.' 3' The report concluded
that because the "capabilities of counterfeiters continue to evolve
rapidly, there is no single. . . technology that provides any long-
term assurance of drug security." 132 The Task Force determined
that a multi-layered approach is required to assure drug security
and that a "combination of rapidly improving 'track and trace'
127 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 5
(2003).
128 Interim Report, supra note 73.
129 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 4(1)
(2003).
130 See Interim Report, supra note 73 (describing various authentication and
track and trace anti-counterfeiting technologies).
131 Final Report, supra note 88.
132 Id.
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technologies and product authentication technologies should pro-
vide a much greater level of security for drug products ... ,"133 The
problem with such rapid implementation of the PMA Act is that
track and trace technologies and authentication technology regula-
tion will not be ready for widespread implementation.
The Task Force determined that Radio-Frequency Identification
(RFID) Technology as an electronic track and trace technology for
the purposes of providing an electronic pedigree for prescription
drugs would provide better protection against counterfeit drugs.
134
The problem with RFID is that mass serialization of RFID technol-
ogy will not be feasible until 2007.135 The FDA is already planning
"to assist.. .in facilitating the rapid, widespread adoption of RFID
in the drug distribution system" by, among other things, address-
ing regulatory and policy issues relating to the use of RFID tech-
nology.136 Because RFID technology will not be ready until 2007,
even with the FDA's assistance in facilitating its widespread adop-
tion and standardization, drugs imported before that time may not
be able to benefit from the anti-counterfeiting potential of that tech-
nology.
The short timeline for drug re-importation under the PMA Act
also may not allow the FDA to develop appropriate regulations re-
garding the authentication 137 measures as part of an anti-
counterfeiting strategy. The FDA determined that "[ajuthen-
tication technologies for pharmaceuticals have been sufficiently
perfected that they can now serve as a critical component of any
strategy to protect products against counterfeiting."1 38 The prob-
lem is that "[b]ecause counterfeiters will adapt rapidly to any par-
ticular measure and because the most effective measures differ by
product, the most effective use of authentication technology will
vary by drug product over time." 139 Consequently, the regulation
requiring specific authentication technologies to be included in
drug packaging, as required by the PMA Act, would not even be
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id
137 See generally id. ("Authentication technologies include measures such as
color shifting inks, holograms, fingerprints, taggants, or chemical markers em-
bedded in a drug or its label.").
138 Id.
139 Id.
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effective as a long term anti-counterfeiting solution. The FDA
plans, however:
[T]o clarify its policies and procedures to help manufactur-
ers employ and update these technologies safely and effec-
tively. In particular, FDA plans to publish a draft guidance
on notification procedures for making changes to products
(e.g., addition of taggants), their packaging, or their label-
ing, for the purpose of encouraging timely adoption and
adaptation of effective technologies for detecting counter-
feit drugs.140
The rapid legalization of drug re-importation under the PMA
Act would most likely occur before these activities are completed.
It may not be prudent to require the legalization of drug re-
importation before the FDA has actually put safeguards in place
that will assist in the adoption of authentication technologies suffi-
cient to detect sophisticated counterfeit drugs, whether or not the
drug manufacturers are already capable of meeting the literal anti-
counterfeiting requirements of the PMA Act.
In addition to its prematurity, the PMA Act has several aspects
that fail to safeguard the health of the American public. Most no-
tably, it removes the ability of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to de-implement the Act even if he or she demonstrates
that it will pose additional risk to the public's health and safety or
that it will not result in a significant reduction in the cost of phar-
maceuticals.141 Obviously, the PMA Act was designed this way be-
cause its supporters intended to legalize drug re-importation,
rather than give the FDA the option to do so. However, the FDA,
due to its expertise in the area of prescription drugs, is probably in
the best position to determine how much risk drug importation
poses to the public health, rather than Congress, and drug re-
importation should only be allowed if the FDA, the regulatory
body charged with assuring the safety of prescription drugs,
deems it safe.
140 Id.
141 Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2003, H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. § 4(10)
(2003); see also 149 CONG. REC. H7532 (daily ed. July 24, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Sessions)(" [I]mportation would be required under H.R. 2427 even if the Secretary
of Health and Human Services believes it would pose 'an additional risk to the
public health and safety.'").
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The PMA Act also merely requires that after importation of a
specific drug or by a specific importer is suspended because of
counterfeit drugs or a violation of the regulations, importation
cannot be resumed until an investigation is complete, eliminating
the requirement that the Secretary determine that the public is
adequately protected from violative products being imported.
42
The elimination of that requirement fails to safeguard public health
because the Secretary would no longer be required to use his dis-
cretion in determining that the public is protected before allowing
the resumption of importation. Perhaps the PMA Act drafters took
exception to the possible broad interpretation of adequate, but
without the additional safeguard provided by the requirement,
importation could resume before the threat of the particular coun-
terfeit drugs, or from the particular importer, has been eliminated.
The risk of the PMA Act to public health has many prongs.
First, as demonstrated in this Section, it may not adequately safe-
guard the safety of legally imported drugs. Second, because, as
demonstrated in Section 4.2, the PMA Act will not effect the low-
ered drug prices that the drafters had hoped, Americans will still
be motivated to import unapproved foreign drugs, which are more
likely to be counterfeit or adulterated, under the personal importa-
tion policy and through internet pharmacies. Third, the FDA's (as
well as other law enforcement officials') ability to enforce anti-
counterfeiting law could be compromised.
Presently, the FDA has the ability to investigate and arrest in-
dividuals participating in counterfeit drug operations inside the
United States143 as well as those offering to import foreign drugs.
144
Drug importation is currently illegal for the precise reason that the
FDA cannot guarantee the safety of imported drugs. The FDA
uses its enforcement power to warn importers of foreign drugs in
order to bring them into compliance, and threaten legal action as a
first step, based solely on the grounds that importing drugs is ille-
142 Id. § 4(7)(B).
143 See Onell R. Soto, U.S. officials close illegal Net pharmacy, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, July 30, 2004, at B1 (describing the arrest of internet pharmacy operators
selling counterfeit drugs, on charges of conspiracy, counterfeiting, fraud and
money-laundering).
144 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Warns CanaRx Services About Its
Illegal Internet Website and Mail Operation Obtaining Unapproved and Potentially Risky
Drugs from Canada (Sept. 16, 2003), at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/
NEWS/2003/NEW00946.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
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gal. 45 The PMA Act would remove the ability from the FDA and
other U.S. officials to shut down drug importation businesses, as
long as they appear to be complying with the reporting require-
ments, without costly long term investigation in order to gather
evidence of other specific violations of U.S. drug law. 146 Given the
abundance of internet pharmacies, investigation and regulation of
all those suspected to be illegally operating may not be feasible.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the vast majority of foreign drugs
are not FDA-approved. It can be very risky to take drugs pur-
chased from an internet pharmacy that imports drugs from foreign
countries such as Canada, and the FDA frequently posts warnings
to consumers regarding counterfeit drugs purchased from drug
importing websites.147 By removing the FDA's ability to stop the
importation of drugs that could be counterfeit without costly in-
vestigation, or even to enforce the law at all against importers lo-
cated outside the borders of the United States (apart from suspend-
ing legal importation), the PMA Act severely hampers the FDA's
ability to protect the public from counterfeit drugs of foreign ori-
gin. Consumers will still be compelled to purchase drugs over the
internet if the PMA Act does not have the cost cutting effect that its
supporters intend; so the FDA's ability to enforce the law against
internet pharmacies will remain important in the future.
4.4. Is the PMA Act Even Necessary?
Recent market changes have actually led to decreased drug
prices in the United States, begging the question of whether or not
the PMA Act is even necessary to provide relief. Both the Hatch-
Waxman Act 148 ("HWA") and the Medicare Prescription Drug and
145 See, e.g., Letter from David J. Horowitz, Esq., Director, Office of Compli-
ance, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Food and Drug Administration,
to C. Bradley Stevens, President/CEO et al., CanadianDiscountDrugs (June 30,
2003) (warning operators of a drug importation business that their activities are
illegal because importing drugs from foreign countries is illegal), available at
http://www.fda.gov/foi/waming-letters/g4376d.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
146 See Soto, supra note 143 (describing the investigation of a drug counterfeit-
ing scheme).
147 See, e.g., U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Test Results of Prescrip-
tion Drugs from Bogus Canadian Website Show All Products Are Fake and Substandard
(July 13, 2004) (warning consumers of a website selling counterfeit drugs), at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01087.html (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
148 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28,
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Modernization Act of 2003149 ("MPDM Act"), as well as improve-
ments in innovation, have helped to significantly reduce drug
prices in the United States.
The HWA was designed to improve consumer access to more
affordable generic drugs. 150 A CBO study conducted in 1998 sum-
marized the effects of the HWA on the generic drug market
151 It
found that between 1984 (the year before the enactment of the
HWA) and 1996, the generic drug market share rose from 19% to
over 40% and that between 1983 and 1998, the percent of top sell-
ing branded drugs with expired patents that had a generic com-
petitor rose from 36% to nearly 100%.152 The impact of the HWA
cannot be denied. However, the HWA did not affect the availabil-
ity of cheaper drugs still protected by a valid patent. Proponents
of the PMA Act might argue that it is necessary to undercut high
prices caused by the patent protection system.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers maintain that current profit lev-
els need to be maintained in order to fund research and develop-
ment.153 Whether weakening patent protection-which would hurt
drug manufacturer profits-would actually stifle innovation is a
subject for analysis in another article. What is certain is that the
HWA has improved availability of cheap generic drugs, saving
Americans a lot of money over the cost of brand name drugs.
154
In addition to the improved availability of generic drugs, there
has been increased availability of therapeutic alternatives, that is,
drugs that treat the same disease or condition, but have different
and 35 U.S.C.).
149 Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003, 108 Pub. L.
No. 173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
150 See generally Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive Settle-
ments Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
317, 318-319 (2002) (describing the changes made by the Hatch-Waxman Act to the
FDA generic drug approval process).
151 Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competition From Generic
Drugs Has Affected Prices And Returns In The Pharmaceutical Industry (July 1998)
[hereinafter HWA Study], available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf
(last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
152 Id.
153 Public Citizen, Pharmaceutical Industry Ranks As Most Profitable Industry -
Again (Apr. 18, 2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/
release.cfm?id=1088 (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
154 See HWA Study, supra note 151 (noting that American consumers saved $8
to $10 billion in 1994 through the purchase of generic drugs).
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active ingredients1SS The increased innovation in the last decade
has led to a wide variety of drugs that tend to reduce prices of pat-
ented drugs, or at least provide cheaper alternatives. 5 6 The devel-
opment of therapeutic alternatives has not managed to lower drug
costs for all Americans to the levels in other countries, as evi-
denced by the rising cost of drugs that the PMA Act is designed to
alleviate. However, the few instances of therapeutic alternatives
that have managed to lower prices of specific drugs indicate that
increased investment in the development of new drugs could be a
better long term solution.
Another recent event to help reduce the costs of drugs was the
MPDM Act, which includes prescription drug benefits, signed into
law by President Bush in December 2003. Some criticize that its es-
timated savings to American senior citizens on prescription drugs
of $400 billion over the next ten years is insufficient to alleviate the
burdens of high drug prices.157 As mentioned above, a CBO study
estimated that the cost savings of the PMA Act would only be $40
billion. Although the proposition that the Medicare benefit is ar-
guably insufficient supports the argument that additional cost cut-
ting measures are required, the incremental increase in savings,
10% of the Medicare savings, may not be worth the increased risk
of exposure to counterfeit drugs. 58
What is most significant about the MPDM Act is that it was en-
acted at all. Although the prescription regulation through the use
of prescription benefits and discounts159 is not comprehensive by
itself, the MPDM Act, as a whole, was a radical restructuring of
Medicare. Because the U.S. government was able to enact compre-
hensive healthcare legislation, such as the MPDM Act, into law, the
argument that comprehensive drug price regulation is unattainable
is weakened. If Congress can enact the MPDM Act, and if it can
155 See, e.g., Stanton, supra note 1, at 157-158 (describing the recent break-
throughs of competing angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors, seratonin up-
take inhibitors, and cholesterol reducing drugs).
156 Id.
157 149 CONG. REC. H7595 (daily ed. July 24, 2003) (statement of Rep. Os-
borne).
158 See 149 CONG. REC. H7595 (daily ed. July 24, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Greenwood) ("The reimportation bill is now an unnecessary relic. We do not have
to trade off safety for affordability. We can offer our seniors both through Medi-
care, and we ought to.").
159 David E. Rosenbaum, Bush Signs Law to Cover Drugs for the Elderly, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at Al.
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withstand the intense lobbying efforts of the pharmaceutical indus-
try, it may also be able to enact comprehensive pricing regulation
that does not involve re-importation.
5. CONCLUSION
Although the PMA Act could potentially help reduce the costs
of prescription drugs for Americans, it comes at too great a cost.
The savings offered by the act are minimal, while the side effects
are severe. Despite the best efforts of the FDA to keep counterfeit
drugs out of the hands of unwitting consumers, counterfeiters
manage to get them into the domestic drug distribution chain.
Opening legal drug distribution to channels outside the U.S. bor-
ders would not save as much money as its proponents claim, nor
would it deter the risky behavior already undertaken by Ameri-
cans seeking cheaper drugs. Foremost, it exposes the American
public to an unacceptable risk of dangerous counterfeit drugs.
The PMA Act, as well as other attempts to legalize drug re-
importation, were the result of the combination of rising drug
prices in the United States, repeated failed attempts by Congress to
lower prices by other means, 160 and intense political pressure.
161 It
is not expected to be enacted into law,162 but Congress continues to
introduce bills that either would directly legalize re-importation
163
or would prevent the FDA from enforcing the ban on importation
by eliminating spending on such enforcement. 164 All of these at-
160 See generally Creech, supra note 6 at 623-626 (describing Congress' attempts
at lowering drug prices by decreased patent protection, Medicare reform, and a
regulatory agency, and the obstacles that frustrated those attempts).
161 See David E. Rosenbaum, The Gathering Storm Over Prescription Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at 4 (describing the political pressure to control the price of
patented drugs); see also Ruby L. Bailey, Seniors' Prescription Drug Costs: Rx For
Hope And Frustration, DETRoIT FREE PRESS, July 10, 2004, ("[Trent] Lott said in a
committee hearing this year that he [supported drug re-importation] because he
no longer could justify to his mother why her medicine was so expensive."), avail-
able at http://www.freep.com/news/metro/stab10_20040710.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2004).
162 H.R. 2427, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2004) (projecting that H.R. 2427 has a 5%
chance of passing either Senate Committee level and the Senate Floor).
163 See Bailey, supra note 161 (describing two recent Senate bills to legalize
drug re-importation).
164 See Sarah Junk, Re-Importing Prescription Drugs Called a Form of 'Russian
Roulette', CYBERCAST NEWS SERV. (July 16, 2004) (noting that the annual spending
bill, as passed by the House, for the AgriCulture Department and the Food and
Drug Administration "would bar the FDA from spending money to enforce the
ban on imports of FDA-approved drugs"), available at http://www.cnsnews.com/
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tempts, particularly the spending bill, pose major issues for drug
safety.
In addition, re-importation's unwanted market effects, such as
possible drug price increases and shortages abroad, would have to
be curtailed with additional regulation. For example, one of the re-
cent Senate bills would make it illegal to restrict sales to foreign
pharmacies that re-import. 65 This provision could help prevent
drug manufacturers from limiting the supply of drugs available for
re-importation, and it might have a strong economic effect. As-
suming that the law has the proper deterrent effect, drug re-
importers would supply the entire U.S. market because they would
purchase drugs under foreign price controls and demand as much
as they can sell back to the United States, unless drug manufactur-
ers lower prices in the United States to compensate.
Before law-makers attempt to enact legislation like this, they
should consider two things apart from the safety-related issues: (1)
some previous attempts at reducing drug prices failed because
they were so comprehensive; 166 and (2) any drug price controls,
whether direct or indirect, could suppress innovation if drug
manufacturers are forced to lower prices in the United States.167 If
the government is willing to use comprehensive regulation to
lower drug prices, it should consider methods besides re-
importation, such as setting up a regulatory agency like the
PMPRB. Such an agency would have much more control over the
price of prescription drugs and would not have to rely on import-
ing price controls from other countries. In addition, however the
U.S. government lowers prices, if doing so hurts drug manufac-
turer profits, it may have to increase funding for the National Insti-
tutes of Health 168 with additional tax money in order to maintain
viewnation.asp?page=%5cnation%5carchive%5c200407%5cnat20040716a.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2004). However, the provision barring the FDA from enforc-
ing the drug importation ban is not expected to survive the House-Senate confer-
ence committee. Id.
165 Bailey, supra note 161.
166 See Creech, supra note 6 at 624-625 (noting that Congress has been reluc-
tant to make bold moves that would require radical restructuring of the healthcare
system).
167 See id. at 593-594 ("[Drug] manufacturers [are] dependent on high prices
in the U.S. to recoup their.., research and development outlays.").
168 Department of Health and Human Services and National Institutes of
Health, NIH Response to the Conference.Report Request for a Plan to Ensure Taxpayers'
Interests Are Protected (noting that four out of 47 FDA-approved drugs with $500
million in sales per year were developed in part with technologies from NIH
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current levels of innovation, which would erode the cost savings of
price controls.
The bottom line is that drug re-importation poses a threat to
the health of the American Public. If the U.S. government wants to
lower prices, and is prepared do so with comprehensive regulation
in order to deal with the possible effects on drug markets and in-
novation, there are safer ways to go about it, such as allowing the
government to negotiate the price of drugs, as Senator John Kerry
suggests. 169 If comprehensive regulation is not an option, then
drug re-importation is not an appropriate solution to the problem
of high drug prices for American consumers because the costs far
outweigh the benefits.
funding), at http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
2004).
169 Bloomberg.com, Kerry Health Plan Would Force Drugmakers to Accept Lower
Prices (Aug. 2, 2004), at http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103
&sid=aPeiNICRh3KA&refer=us (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
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